The European commission has told Corporate Europe Observatory that it authorised this move subject to some conditions. In the 12 months after leaving the commission, Jouanjean is not allowed to engage in any lobbying with staff of the commission on behalf of his new employer on issues for which he had been responsible in the previous three years. And for two years after leaving the commission he is to “refrain from any professional contact in relation to new activities with the services that were under his authority” in DG budget. Mr Jouanjean was also asked to ensure that his new employer was aware of these conditions.
Hervé Jouanjean was director-general of DG budget from July 2009 to April 2014 where he apparently provided “strategic guidance and general management to the budget DG”. He had a 20 year+ career at the commission where he was also deputy secretary-general responsible for inter-institutional relations (European parliament and council of ministers of the EU) as well as a director in the commission's international trade department until 2003.
“We assist the firm’s clients in all aspects relating to antitrust law, from conducting antitrust audits to defending them in antitrust proceedings. FIDAL also provides its clients with solutions in the following areas: regulatory, European lobbying, defense strategies against distorted competition from goods coming from non-EU countries, European procedures before the Commission and the Luxembourg courts. The arrival of Hervé Jouanjean allows us to further strengthen our offering”.
"After many years at the Commission, joining the firm Fidal is for me a great opportunity to provide the firm's clients my knowledge of the workings of the European Institutions and the skills that I have acquired throughout my career, notably in the areas of the internal market, international trade and the Commission's own procedures”.
According to his linked-in profile, Jouanjean provides Fidal clients with “advice on European issues in general, including the internal market and international trade policy issues”.
Despite clearly offering EU lobbying services to clients, Fidal is not in the EU's lobby transparency register so it is not possible to see a list of its clients or the specific dossiers upon which it works.
In July 2014, Jouanjean was part of the Friends of the European Commission group of former EU officials, advisers and private sector representatives (some of whom have also been through the revolving door) who have developed a programme of reform for the way in which the commission organises itself.
Update 7 July 2015
On 1 July 2015, Fidal joined the EU lobby register and Jouanjean was named as the person "in charge of EU relations". Issues lobbited on are recorded as "Politique de concurrence; Politique Commerce international; Marché intérieur" and in the year to September 2014, Fidal declares lobby revenue of €100,000-€499,999 and clients: Groupe Gascogne, T&D, E-Motors, ACCOR, AVSF, Expanscience, Guillin.
The first condition placed on Jouanjean by the Commission (no lobbying with staff of the commission on behalf of his new employer on issues for which he had been responsible in the previous three years) has now expired, he is still unable to have any "professional contact in relation to new activities with the services that were under his authority” in DG budget until April 2016. In CEO's view, Jouanjean should have been banned from all EU lobbying for three years after leaving the Commission and thus, should not be able to be billed as Fidal's person in charge of EU relations.
“Revised revolving door rules for EU staff require the commission to implement a ban on direct lobbying by senior officials for 12 months. The commission appears to have gone further than this and placed some lobby restrictions on Jouanjean for an additional year. However, the commission's revolving door restrictions remain too weak and the rules remain silent about the risk of indirect lobbying. Jouanjean's own comments make clear that he plans to provide Fidal's clients with his knowledge of the workings of the European institutions; the commission should ensure that former officials are not able to use their considerable authority, influence and insider know-how to benefit private clients behind-the-scenes, even if it does not include direct lobbying or contacts with former colleagues. The commission should also put in place mechanisms to ensure that revolving door restrictions are fully monitored and adhered to by ex-officials.”