The EU’s FTA talks: is water included?

The EU’s FTA talks: is water included?

CEO/TNI Water Justice Project

--- draft paper, please do not circulate or quote ---

This paper presents the first insights and embryonic conclusions about the question whether the EU is using its FTA talks to push for new markets for EU-based water multinationals. While the evidence is inconclusive and more research is needed, the plot is thickening! Your feedback is very welcome! The two questions we are seeking answers to are: 1: does the EU pursue market access, liberalisation or other objectives for water services sectors in the FTA talks? If so, what are the objectives and where is this defined? 2: if this is the case, how have other governments reacted? Is there controversy around this issue in the different FTA talks? Background: water in the WTO’s GATS negotiations In February 2003, the EU’s GATS requests to third countries were leaked and entered the public domain.i It became clear that the EU was asking 72 countries to liberalise water services, including full market access and 'national treatment' to foreign investors. The EU also targeted water services in many of the world’s poorest countries, including 14 Least-Developed Countries (LDCs).ii Leaked correspondence between Commission officials and some of the world’s largest water multinationals moreover showed that the EU requests were influenced by the wish lists of these private water giants.iii Suez, Veolia and Thames Water were among the firms which the Commission had asked to identify priority markets as well as which changes in regulations they would like to see happen as a result of GATS. The EU came under heavy criticism from trade unions and civil society campaigners from around the world. Among the many strong arguments against the EU requests were: water privatization has proven to endanger, not improve, access to water for the poorest international trade talks are not an appropriate forum for deciding about water management issues GATS commitments reduce the policy freedom of (local) governments, for instance the choice to abandon privatization due to problematic experiences In the years after, the water requests became one of the most controversial aspects of the EU’s GATS agenda.iv This eventually resulted in Thames Water, fearing damage to their image, going public with statements that they do not support including water in GATS. Belgium, the UK and other EU governments distanced themselves from the water requests and the Commission was increasingly isolated in its defense of the requests. In January 2005, the EU submitted its revised requests, which included somewhat less comprehensive demands for water sector liberalization. In December 2005 Norway withdrew its GATS requests for water, energy and education. As a result of this, drinking water was explicitly excluded from the plurilateral requests which the EU tabled together with Norway, Canada, the US and other countries in February 2006. It should be noted that the EU has never withdrawn its water requests from the GATS talks. In January 2006, Commissioner Mandelson, in response to parliamentary question, stated that the EC requests “simply aim to facilitate the opening up of these services to international operators if and when the responsible public authorities freely choose to do so, for instance through any form of public-private partnership of their choice.”v To summarise, the campaigns against water in GATS had a very strong political impact, but did not succeed in making the European Commission change its long-term objectives. Over the last few years, the Commission has started new bilateral and bi-regional free trade negotiations with the former colonies in Africa, Caribbean and Pacific he socalled EPAs), with the Gulf countries, with Central America, with India, South Korea, and with the countries of CAN and ASEAN.vi Is the EU pursuing liberalisation of water and sanitation services in these FTA talks? Questions to EU trade officials Naively perhaps, we decided to simply ask the Commission’s trade officials. We for instance asked Sandro Paolicchi (DG Trade Policy Co-ordinator for ASEAN) the following simple question: “Does the EU pursue market access, liberalisation or other objectives with regards to water services in the ongoing free trade negotiations with the EU-ASEAN countries? If so, what are the EU's objectives and where is this defined?” Paolicchi’s response, unfortunately, was far less straightforward (our emphasis with italics): “As regards your question on water services in the EU-ASEAN FTA negotiations, we are not in a position to provide specific indications on negotiating objectives and issues currently under discussion with ASEAN. We can however indicate that, in the framework of the services negotiations, the Commission does not intend to request the ASEANs to negotiate commitments on water distribution services. More generally, as reflected in the EU Water Initiative and its Code of Conduct, the involvement of the private sector in the delivery of water services is a national or local government choice.”vii Ignoring the rather hypocrite statement about “national or local government choice” for now, Paolicchi’s reply provides some food for thought. As our question was about water services, does the specific mention of water distribution services mean that the EU does pursue commitments for other water services (water purification, waste water treatment, etc.)? And the phrase “in the framework of the services negotiations”, does this mean that the EU pursues water distribution in the framework of procurement, investment or other parts of the FTA talks? Are we reading too much between the lines here? We decided to ask Mr. Paolicchi for clarification. He responded that “as indicated previously, we are not in a position to provide more specific indications on ongoing negotiations with the ASEANs.”viii Other trade officials responded with almost identical replies to our questions regarding the other FTA talks. There are however subtle differences in the replies, differences which may or may not be important. About the Gulf countries, for instance, Miriam Kominarecova replied that “the Commission does not intend to request from the GCC the liberalisation of water distribution services.“ix Lisa Mackie replied with the exact same formulation about the EU-India talks.x When we asked Lisa Mackie whether the EU requests liberalisation of other water services, her response was: “As indicated, we are not in a position to provide more specific indications on ongoing negotiations. I'm sure you'll understand.”xi Paul Bonnefoy stated that “the Commission does not intend to request to the Andean Community the liberalisation of water services.”xii One could conclude that the Commission in its FTA talks with the Andean Community is clearer about not targeting the water sector. But unfortunately things are not as simple as that. What the EU mandates say After having asked the EU negotiators and not getting clear answers from them, we decided to closely read the wording of the mandates approved by EU governments for these different FTA talks. The mandates for some of the EU FTAs were leaked and made available on the bilaterals.org website. Surely these mandates should show clearly whether or not water is included in the negotiations? Wrong again: the mandates are far from clear on these issues. The mandate for the EU-ASEAN talks, for instance, aims for “far-reaching liberalisation of services and investment“, but does not mention water at all.xiii The section about public procurement, however, states that “the Agreement will envisage the progressive liberalisation of procurement markets at national, regional and, where appropriate, local levels, as well as in the field of public utilities, in particular in priority sectors.”xiv Based on this one would think that services provided by water utilities are in fact part of the negotiations. The mandate for the FTA talks between the EU and the Andean countries is more explicit, stating that “the Parties shall agree on measures aimed at the progressive liberalisation of their respective procurement markets at all levels of public authorities and public entities in the water, energy and transport sectors as well as for information and communication networks.”xv Identical wording is included in the mandate for the EU-Central America talks.xvi Does this mean that the EU has a different approach to water issues in the different FTA’s? Considering the logic underlying the EU’s approach international trade policies (‘what is good for EU-based corporations is good for the EU’), it is unlikely that the EU is be less ambitious about water sector liberalization in the ASEAN countries than in the far less lucrative markets of Central America and the Andes countries. Through the grapevine Feedback from NGOs that are closely following the FTA talks proved more illuminating. It is for instance important to realize that in the EU-Mercosur talks, which have been blocked since 2004, the most recent services offers only mentioned sewage treatment. The EU requests for water sector liberalisation were ‘hidden’ in the chapter on investment and water distribution was fully included. Concerning the EU-CAN talks, for instance, water is part of official negotiation mandate and senior officials from both sides have confirmed that the EU is still pursuing it actively. A no less important insight is that Bolivian negotiators have said they will quit the negotiations if the EU will push for its water demands. Concerning the EU-India talks, as water is not excluded, there is every reason to be concerned. The Indian government is very reluctant to opening public procurement, but the EU may push for water liberalization as part of services (including environmental services) and investment negotiations. In the EU-South Korea talks, the two parties appear to have agreed on a positive list for the services negotiations, and water has been excluded, most likely because it is such a politically explosive issue. However, as it is the Korean government’s national policy to privatize water delivery, the Korean water sector may be opened up to EU corporations and the FTA (if complemented) could worsen this situation. Concerning the EPAs, the fundamental problem is that the EU requests are not public and the EU negotiators use a flexible and untransparent approach. The Caribbean services offer, however, shows that water supply is not included, but sewage services and wastewater treatment are. Five countries made mode 3 commitments in sewage services: Barbados and Dominican Republic without any reservation; Saint Kitts and Nevis; Saint Vincent and the Grenadines on the condition of joint ventures. Suriname will open in 2018 but will require transfer of technology. Nine countries made mode 3 commitments in waste and waste water management: Antigua and Barbuda; Dominican Republic; Saint Kitts and Nevis without reservations; Grenada, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad & Tobago on the condition of joint ventures; Belize on the condition of technology transfer; Suriname: in 2018 on the condition of technology transfer. Corporate lobbying & privileged access Much more research is needed on this issue, but it is clear that the European Services Forum (ESF) has lobbied the Commission also specifically on the issue of water and other essential services in the FTA talks. In March 2006, for instance, the ESF encouraged “the EU not to take ideological stances opposing further services liberalisation on issues such as services of general interest.”xvii The preliminary results of CEO’s research into corporate lobbying around the Commission’s ‘Global Europe’ strategy and the various FTA’s shows that lobby groups like the ESF have privileged access to information about the EU’s negotiating goals and positions. This stands in sharp contract to the responses that CEO got from Commission negotiators (“we are not in a position to provide specific indications on negotiating objectives and issues currently under discussion with ASEAN”). The ESF and other corporate lobby groups, moreover, are structurally kept informed and closely consulted, in a way that no civil society groups are. Preliminary conclusions The Commission is almost certainly pursuing market access for water services as part of the FTA talks, but prefers to keep this vague to avoid political controversy. The water-out-of-GATS campaigns have clearly had a strong and lasting impact, but not to the extent that the Commission has given up including water in trade agreements. Most likely, negotiators are assessing how strong the skepticism towards water sector commitments is among the different governments they are negotiating with; the EU negotiators are then likely to push for concessions whenever they see opportunities to do so. This nontransparent, Machiavellian approach is unacceptable. The Commission must put its cards on the table and make clear: what the EU’s goals are for the inclusion of essential services like water in FTAs? Instead of the politically controversial drinking water distribution, the Commission’s focus seems to be on other water services, such as sewage and wastewater treatment. Including these other water services in FTAs is however no less problematic than is the case with drinking water; these are services where major efforts towards improvements in public management are needed in the coming decades, efforts that could seriously jeopardized by locking in liberalisation and privatization through FTAs. Moreover, taking over non-drinking water services provide European water multinationals with effective inroads into new markets, with the prospect to expand into drinking water supply at a later stage. Possible next steps - Open letter to Commissioner Mandelson, insisting that the Commission puts its cards on the table - and stating our demands for water to be taken out of FTA negotiations? - Knowing that Mandelson is unlikely to provide transparency, we could explore other ways to get hold of FTA offers/demands for environmental services, procurement, investment and wherever else water may be hidden. - MEPs could demand insight into the requests (as happened with GATS) - Further research to document the role of corporate lobbying for water liberalization through FTAs (for instance, via access-to-documents requests) Thanks to: Gopa Kumar, Peter Fuchs, Sohi Jeon, Christian Russau, Marc Maes, Tom, Mariken Gaanderse, Charly Poppe, Tom Kuchartz, Vicky Cann and others. Your comments, suggestions and other feedback to this draft paper are very welcome: olivier@corporateeurope.org & satoko@tni.org